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THE ITALIAN MODEL TO FIGHT COVID-19:
REGIONAL COOPERATION, REGULATORY
INFLATION, AND THE COST OF ONE-SIZEFITS-ALL LOCKDOWN MEASURES
FERNANDA NICOLA* & GINO SCACCIA**
What has come to be known worldwide as the Italian model to fight COVID-19 was
a series of governmental measures undertaken in early 2020 to reduce the contagion of a
deadly virus ravaging the northern regions of Italy—especially Lombardy, Veneto, and
Piedmont. These measures included quarantine or lockdown throughout the Italian territory,
together with the revamping of hospitals, followed by economic recovery packages to address
the standstill of the national economy. This Article focuses on the strengths and weaknesses
of the Italian model. By highlighting the initial missteps, we can understand how this
turned into a productive national and regional coordination model through a learning-bymonitoring process. However, the Italian model was implemented at a high cost, due to the
overextension of executive action and the lack of territorial differentiation. After the President
of the Italian Republic suggested stronger parliamentary involvement in the executive
lockdown measures, the legislative branch began to give full legal force to the governmental
provisional regulations. Rather than tailoring the regulatory measures according to the
impacted regions, the government imposed a long and widespread lockdown throughout the
country by means of an overregulation and bureaucratization of social life, which produced
high human and economic costs for the country. In hindsight, the Italian government did
not narrowly tailor the lockdown measures or lift them in those regions with limited
infections. As a result, this widespread and micromanaged governmental action has created
new and effective administrative processes of regional–national cooperation in public health,
but it has also triggered distrust toward the way in which public authorities managed the
pandemic during the different phases of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Fernanda G. Nicola, Professor of Law at the Washington College of Law, American
University and Director of the Program on International Organizations Law and Development.
** Gino Scaccia, Full Professor of Public Law at the University of Teramo; Adjunct
Professor of Constitutional Law at Luiss University Rome.
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INTRODUCTION
What experts have called the “Italian model to fight COVID-19” can be
summarized in three steps: diminish viral contagions through quarantine and
widespread, generalized, integral lockdown; increase the capacity of medical
facilities; and adopt social and financial recovery packages to address the
pandemic-induced economic crisis.1 Even if other nations initially viewed the
Italian model with suspicion, it has since become an effective model—
especially in subnational cooperation between regions, cities, and the central
government. However, this model also came at a high cost for the Italian
economy and was very much criticized by legal scholars due to the restriction
of civil liberties, which created tensions in the Italian constitutional framework.
This Article fills the gap in the literature in assessing the institutional strengths
and the pitfalls of this model.
In Part I, after depicting the constitutional framework of emergency powers,
we focus on what has been heralded as Italy’s decentralized or institutional
cooperation2 across its different levels of government, regions, provinces, and
cities in fighting COVID-19. Despite early missteps and conflicts between the
national government and the regions in coordinating public health, both
institutions have learned how to make decentralization more effective.

1. See Mauro Pasquini, Mismanagement of the Coronavirus Emergency and the Italian Model,
IMPAKTER (Mar. 19, 2020), https://impakter.com/mismanagement-of-the-coronavirus-emer
gency-and-the-italian-model/.
2. See DANIELLE ALLEN ET AL., ROADMAP TO PANDEMIC RESILIENCE: MASSIVE SCALE
TESTING, TRACING, AND SUPPORTED ISOLATION (TTSI) AS THE PATH TO PANDEMIC RESILIENCE
FOR A FREE SOCIETY 50 (2020), https://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-for-ethics/files/roadmap
topandemicresilience_final_0.pdf.
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In Part II we address the cost of the lockdown in terms of the overregulation
and bureaucratization in fighting the spreading of COVID-19. In particular,
we show how the management of the health emergency has contributed to
the concentration of powers in the executive branch. Such concentration also
spurred competence conflicts among different levels of government often
resolved by adjudication, rather than through institutional collaboration.
Finally, the extensive and nonselective lockdown through the Italian territory,
including the less affected southern regions with little contagion, halted the
country’s economy with long-term implications for the country’s public debt.
In the long term, the inadequacy of “one-size-fits-all” measures adopted by
the government not only created different distributive outcomes by
heightening the inequality among Italian regions but also diminished Italian
citizens’ level of trust in the government.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, EMERGENCY POWERS,
AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

The Italian Constitution, unlike the famous models of Article 48 in the
Weimar Constitution of 1919,3 Article 16 of the French Constitution,4 Article
116 of the Spanish Constitution,5 and Article 48 of the Hungarian
Constitution,6 does not include a specific provision regulating a state of
emergency. Except for a declaration of war, when Parliament can vest in the
Executive all necessary powers with no constraints, the Italian Constitution
does not provide for extraordinary emergency powers; it does not allow either
the suspension of fundamental rights or the delegation of powers unmoored
from parliamentary control to the Executive. This constitutional omission is
not by chance. In fact, Article 77 provides a general legislative measure for
facing “extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency.”7 This law decree—

3. DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [WEIMAR CONSTITUTION] Aug. 11, 1919,
art. 48 (Ger.).
4. 1958 CONST., art. 16 (Fr.).
5. C.E., B.O.E. n. 116, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
6. MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY],
ALAPTÖRVÉNY, Apr. 25, 2011, art. 48.
7. Art. 77 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [CONSTITUTION] (It.), translated in SENATO DELLA
REPUBLICA, CONSTITUTION OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC 20–21, http://www.senato.it/documen
ti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf (“The Government may not, without an
enabling act from the Houses, issue a decree having force of law. When the Government, in
case of necessity and urgency, adopts under its own responsibility a temporary measure, it shall
introduce such measure to Parliament for transposition into law. During dissolution, Parliament
shall be convened within five days of such introduction. Such a measure shall lose effect from
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which must be adopted by the Council of Ministers and signed by the President
of the Republic—is immediately effective. However, it needs to be transposed
into law by Parliament within sixty days from its publication otherwise it
expires and becomes void with retroactive effect.8 As a result, the Italian
constitutional framework ensures that no infringement upon fundamental
rights is allowed by the executive branch without parliamentary oversight and
the prior scrutiny of the President of the Republic. The President can also
refuse to sign patently unconstitutional decrees. In a nutshell, during the
spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Italian constitutional framework, as
we will describe below, has been pushed to its very limit.
A. The Spread of the COVID-19 Pandemic as a National Emergency
The first case of COVID-19 in Italy appeared in late January when
Chinese tourists from Wuhan were hospitalized in Rome after passing
through Milan. The same day they were hospitalized, the Italian Minister of
Health Roberto Speranza announced the suspension of flights to and from
China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan to prevent the spread of the virus.9
Italy was the first European Union (EU) country to ban flights to and from
China 10 In hindsight, this ban occurred too late and gave the pandemic
enough time to spread in northern Italy.11
Before the first COVID-19 case appeared, an unusually high number of
pneumonia cases emerged in Codogno, a small town in the Lombardy
region.12 Soon afterward, a researcher at the company Unilever was the first
Italian patient diagnosed with COVID-19.13 Authorities quickly confirmed
the outbreak in Codogno—the “Wuhan of Italy” as it has been called—and
social life came to a halt.14 Codogno’s mayor adopted several ordinances

the beginning if it is not transposed into law by Parliament within sixty days of its publication.
Parliament may regulate the legal relations arisen from the rejected measure.”).
8. Id.
9. See Italy’s Hopes for Closer China Ties Hit by Coronavirus Flight Ban Rift, STRAITS TIME (Feb.
10, 2020, 10:11 PM), https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/italys-hopes-for-closerchina-ties-hit-by-coronavirus-flight-ban-rift.
10. See Decreto ministeriale 30 gennaio 2020, n.203, G.U. Feb. 1, 2020, n.26 (It.).
11. See Mélissa Godin, Why Is Italy’s Coronavirus Outbreak So Bad?, TIME (Mar. 10, 2020,
2:18 PM), https://time.com/5799586/italy-coronavirus-outbreak/.
12. See Emilio Parodi & Angelo Amante, As Coronavirus Slams Italy, Paralysis and Anxiety Spread,
REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-italy-paralysis-insight/as-corona
virus-slams-italy-paralysis-and-anxiety-spread-idUSKCN20M2WB (Feb. 28, 2020, 1:44 PM).
13. See Godin, supra note 11.
14. See Sean Coughlan, Lessons from the Lockdown: What Happens When Everyday Life Suddenly Changes?,
BBC (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/dj3jonuhi1/coronavirus-year-of-the-mask.
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requesting citizens to stay home and wear masks when going out.15 A few
days later, other small municipalities started to implement similar
measures.16 Although Codogno had thirty-five new cases per day at the
beginning of the outbreak, by the second week of March, the city registered
only few infections.17 In this first phase of the outbreak, the command-andcontrol chain was totally centralized in the government.
On January 31, 2020, the Italian government declared a state of national
emergency,18 on the premise that ordinary measures would have been unfit
to cope with such a pervasive and severe crisis.19 A state of national
emergency enables various institutions—including the National Department
of Civil Protection (Protezione Civile),20 the Ministry of Health,21 and regional
and municipal governments22—to take extraordinary measures to respond to
the pandemic. In early February, the Ministry of Health adopted a series of
ordinances.23 Some of these ordinances restricted civil liberties to preserve
public health, such as the lockdown where the government implemented
active surveillance over those citizens who had close contact with COVID-19

15. See Explained: How Italy Is Handling Coronavirus Outbreak, LOCAL (Feb. 22, 2020, 10:00
AM), https://www.thelocal.it/20200222/explained-how-italy-is-handling-co.
16. See Greata Privitera, Italy Looks at Life After Lockdown—with Fear and Reluctance,
POLITICO (Apr. 8, 2020, 10:04 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/08/italylooks-at-life-after-lockdown-with-fear-and-reluctance-176490.
17. See Colleen Barry, Italy’s Coronavirus Ground Zero Sets Virtuous Example, U.S. NEWS (Mar.
13, 2020, 10:33 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-03-13/italyscoronavirus-ground-zero-sets-virtuous-example.
18. See Decreto legislativo 2 gennaio 2018 n.1, G.U. Jan. 22, 2018, n.17 (It.); Italy Govt
Agrees State of Emergency after Confirmed Coronavirus Cases – Govt Source, REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/china-health-italy/italy-govt-agrees-state-of-emergencyafter-confirmed-coronavirus-cases-govt-source-idUSR1N282044.
19. See Italy Declares State of Emergency Over Coronavirus, FRANCE 24 (Jan. 31, 2020, 2:10 PM),
https://www.france24.com/en/20200131-italy-declares-state-of-emergency-over-coronavirus.
20. For emergency powers, see arts. 7, 24 D.Lgs. n.1/2018 (It.). See generally Emergenza
Coronavirus, PROTEZIONE CIVILE, http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/home (last visited Mar.
4, 2021) (providing general information regarding the Protezione Civile and its role).
21. See Novel Coronavirus, MINISTERO DELLA SALUTE, http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/nuo
vocoronavirus/homeNuovoCoronavirus.jsp?lingua=english (last visited Mar. 4, 2021). The
Ministry of Health’s powers are found in Art. 32 Legge 23 dicembre 1978 n.833, G.U. n.360 (It.).
22. See Art. 117 Decreto legislativo 31 marzo 1998, n.112, G.U. Apr. 21, 1998, n.92
(enabling the president of the region to adopt provisional emergency ordinances); Art. 50
Decreto legislativo 18 agosto 2000, n.267, G.U. Sept. 28, 2000, n.227 (enabling mayors to adopt
provisional emergency measures).
23. See generally Decreto legge 23 febbraio 2020, n.6, G.U. Feb. 23, 2020, n.45 (codifying
a range of health ordinances previously adopted by the health minister).
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patients and over those who arrived in Italy after being in the areas ravaged by
the pandemic in China.
When the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global
pandemic,24 Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte enacted various decrees
(DPCMs) that are not subject to parliamentary control or signed by the
President of the Republic.25 In his effort to fight the spread of the virus, the
Prime Minister adopted DPCMs that limit fundamental rights enshrined in
the Italian Constitution, such as personal liberty, freedom of movement, and
freedom of assembly.26 Although constitutional rights are not absolute, only
Parliament has the authority to limit them.27 Both scholars and political
commentators have criticized the adoption of these initial DPCMs, objecting
that they were devoid of the force of law and displayed a fragile legislative
basis.28 However, the Council of Ministers adopted the first decree with the
full force of law to contain the health crisis on February 23, 2020 (D.L. n.
6/2020).29 That decree set the regulatory framework for the government to
act during the first phase of the emergency.
Between February 23 and April 10, the Prime Minister adopted nine decrees
and the President signed four law decrees to implement lockdown measures,
demonstrating the Italian government’s quick response to a pandemic that
disproportionately affected Italy’s northern and central regions.30 The legal and

24. See WHO Announces COVID-19 Outbreak a Pandemic, WHO (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.
euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19/news/news/2020/
3/who-announces-covid-19-outbreak-a-pandemic.
25. See arts. 5, 17 Legge 23 agosto 1988, n.400, G.U. Sept. 12, 1988, n.214 (determining the
powers of the President of the Council of Minister and the regulatory powers of the government).
26. See Arianna Vedaschi & Chiara Graziani, Coronavirus Emergency and Public Law Issues: An
Update on the Italian Situation, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Mar. 12, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/
coronavirus-emergency-and-public-law-issues-an-update-on-the-italian-situation/.
27. Id.
28. See Francesca Rescigno, La Gestione del Coronavirus e L’impianto Costituzionale. Il fine Non
giustifica Ogni Mezzo, 2020 OSSERVATORIO COSTITUZIONALE 253 (It.); Gaetano Azzariti, I Limiti
Costituzionali Della Situazione D’emergenza Provocati dal Covid-19, QUESTIONE GIUSTIZIA (Mar. 27,
2020), https://www.questionegiustizia.it/articolo/i-limiti-costituzionali-della-situazione-d-emer
genza-provocata-dal-covid-19_27-03-2020.php.
29. See generally D.L. n. 6/2020 (It.).
30. See id. (providing authorities, in all municipalities in which at least one person was
positive, power to promote containment measures proportionate to the evolution of the
epidemiological situation); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 23 febbraio 2020,
n.294, G.U. Feb. 23, 2020, n.45 (implementing D.L. n. 6/2020, establishing containment
measures in Lombardy and Veneto, and providing for additional tax benefits and reliefs);
Decreto ministeriale 24 febbraio 2020, n.20A01299, G.U. Feb. 26, 2020, n.48 (implementing
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political framework did not change since the adoption of Law Decree no. 19 of
March 25, 2020. This decree was adopted to overcome the constitutional
challenges that commentators had raised on D.L. n. 6/2020; specifically, that
it left the powers of Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte unrestrained, thus causing
an eclipse of civil liberties.31
the tax benefits established by D.P.C.M. 23 Feb., 2020); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei
Ministri 25 febbraio 2020, n.306, G.U. Feb. 25, 2020, n.47 (introducing new measures for all
northern regions, such as the cancellation of sporting events and the establishment of online
classes for all educational infrastructures); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 1
marzo 2020, n.346, G.U. Mar. 1, 2020, n.52 (rationalizing the set of interventions made
throughout the Italian national territory); Decreo legge 2 marzo 2020, n.9, G.U. Mar. 2, 2020,
n.53 (addressing the negative effects the virus produces on the national socio-economic
framework by financially supporting citizens and firms); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei
Ministri 4 marzo 2020, n.394, G.U. Mar. 4, 2020, n.55 (containing new measures to limit the
COVID-19 spread throughout the entire country); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei
Ministri 8 marzo 2020, n.417, G.U. Mar. 8, 2020, n.59 (declaring Lombardy and the
municipalities from different northern regions of Modena, Parma, Piacenza, Reggio Emilia,
Rimini, Pesaro e Urbino, Venezia, Padova, Treviso, Novara, Asti, Alessandria, VerbanoCusio-Ossola, and Vercelli were in the “red zone,” limiting the freedom of movement); Decreto
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 9 marzo 2020, n.421, G.U. Mar. 9, 2020, n.62 (so-called
“I am staying home decree,” expanding the measures adopted on March 8 to the entire Italian
territory, making the entirety of Italy red zone); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri
11 marzo 2020, n.429, G.U. Mar. 11, 2020, n.64 (closing all commercial and retail activities
except for grocery stores, basic need stores, and services including pharmacies and parapharmacies); Decreto Legge 17 marzo 2020, n.18, G.U. Mar. 17, 2020, n.70 (so-called “Cure
Italy Decree,” containing multiple financial provisions aimed at enhancing the national health
system and funding the Protezione Civile and other institutions involved in the emergency; also,
suspending the payment of taxes and other financial obligations while creating financial
measures that supported furloughed workers, giving credit to families and micro, small, and
medium firms); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 22 marzo 2020, n.521, G.U. Mar.
22, 2020, n.76 (stopping all industrial and commercial production activities (with some
exceptions) and prohibiting all citizens from moving to a municipality different from the one in
which the person was residing, except for work needs, absolute emergencies, or health reasons);
Decreto Legge 25 marzo 2020, n.19, G.U. Mar. 25, 2020, n.79 (providing the possibility of
adopting measures for only specific parts of the national territory in order to contain health
risks and the spread of the contagion). Each measure listed in the March 25 decree, once
adopted, is not supposed to last for more than thirty days; however, the measures are repeatable
and can be changed multiple times till the end of the state of emergency. D.L. n. 19/2020. The
decree increases penalties and fines for those who do not respect the restrictions imposed. Id.
31. See Michele Ainis, Il bisticcio del potere, LA REPUBBLICA (Mar. 3, 2020), https://rep.rep
ubblica.it/pwa/commento/2020/03/03/news/coronavirus_parlamento_leggi-250153929/
(explaining the necessity of the restrictions to supersede the “freedom of movement” envisaged
in Article 16 of the Constitution); see also Ilenia Massa Pinto, La tremendissima lezione del Covid-19
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Although the Prime Minister’s Decrees introduced meaningful measures,
the government adopted the most powerful set of policies with two law
decrees: the “Cure Italy Decree”32 and the “Liquidity Decree.”33 Together,
these law decrees offered a stimulus package of 425 billion euros (around
$500 billion) to revamp the economy and to help support families, workers,
and enterprises.34 The government adopted these financial measures in
consultation with the European Commission.35
When public health experts noticed on April 26 that the pandemic curve
was going down, another DPCM started the so-called Phase 2.36 From May
4 onward, the government lightened the stay-at-home measures, allowing
businesses to reopen and social life to awaken.37

(anche) ai giuristi, QUESTIONE GIUSTIZIA (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.questionegiustizia.it/arti
colo/la-tremendissima-lezione-del-covid-19-anche-ai-giuristi_18-03-2020.php (arguing from a
constitutional perspective that the central government’s response to the pandemic at that point
had done nothing but exacerbate the situation); Marco Olivetti, Coronavirus. Così le norme contro il
virus possono rievocare il “dictator,” AVVENIRE (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.avvenire.it/opinioni/
pagine/cos-le-norme-contro-il-virus-possono-rievocare-il-dictator (declaring it is necessary for
the public to be critical of the government’s response, because to do otherwise would be
“tantamount to putting the Constitution in quarantine”); Francesco Clementi, Coronavirus, quando
l’emergenza restringe le libertà meglio un decreto legge che un Dpcm, IL SOLE 24 ORE, https://24plus.ilsole
24ore.com/art/coronavirus-quando-l-emergenza-restringe-liberta-meglio-decreto-legge-chedpcm-ADfpIxC (June 24, 2020) (expressing concern that the use of DPCMs, which are easily
challenged in any regional administrative court, renders the legal response by the government
legally fragile, creating great uncertainty about the stability of the new legal processes structuring
the day-to-day lives of Italians during the pandemic); Marco Plutino, I Decreti di Conte sul
Coronavirus sono sconosciuti alla Costituzione, IL RIFORMISTA (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.ilriformi
sta.it/i-decreti-di-conte-sul-coronavirus-sono-sconosciuti-alla-costituzione-62221/ (asserting while
the norms furthered by the government’s response to coronavirus are important, they are
secondary to the norm enshrined in the Italian Constitution).
32. D.L. n. 18/2020 (It.).
33. Decreto Legge 8 aprile 2020, n.23, G.U. aprile 8, 2020, n.94.
34. See Diletta Tega & Michele Massa, Fighting COVID 19 – Legal Powers and Risks: Italy,
VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/fighting-covid-19-legalpowers-and-risks-italy/ (discussing purpose of “Cure Italy” decree and how the allocated 25
billion euros may be used for managing COVID-19); Italy Enacts “Liquidity Decree” to Further
Manage COVID-19, EY TAX NEWS UPDATE: GLOB. EDITION (Ernst & Young Glob. Ltd.,
London, U.K.), Apr. 10, 2020, at 1 (summarizing “liquidity” decree as injecting 400 billion
euros into the Italian market).
35. D.L. n. 18/2020 (It.); D.L. n. 23/2020 (It.)
36. Coronavirus: Italy’s PM Outlines Lockdown Easing Measures, BBC (Apr. 27, 2020), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52435273.
37. Id.
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B. Conflicts Between Central and Regional Governments
The central and regional governments share legislative and administrative
powers.38 This means that it is up to the central government to design
principles that regions must apply and implement. The regional governments
conduct the administrative management of health services, like hospitals, and
they are bound to follow and implement the guidelines of the Ministry of
Health, a branch of the central government.39
The emergency created by the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the
limits of the Italian model of distribution of competencies among the different
levels of government. Indeed, in the management of the health crises, besides
state and regional authorities, there are other institutional subjects, such as
municipalities, provinces, prefects, and civil protection, with overlapping public
health competencies. The need for more coordination among the different
institutional levels was underlined in the National Plan for Preparedness and
Response to an Influenza Pandemic, drafted in 2006 and never updated since
then.40 However, as soon as the COVID-19 crisis exploded, and the public
institutions were forced to move from theory to practice, missteps and
administrative inefficiencies emerged. Regional measures misaligned with
national ones, delays and overlapping competencies in the implementation of
state and regional acts on the municipal level, and administrative gridlocks all
caused distrust and disorientation among citizens.
After the COVID-19 outbreak in Codogno, several governors of Italy’s
northern regions claimed that the virus was just a seasonal flu and did not take
immediate quarantine measures. In downplaying the situation, on February
25, Attilio Fontana, Governor of Lombardy41 and a member of the right-wing
populist party Lega, declared that it was undoubtedly a difficult situation, but
not dangerous.42 Indeed, at the beginning of the outbreak, the central
38. As for public health, it is listed among the twenty-three shared legislative competencies
between state and regions. Art. 117 COSTITUZIONE [COST.].
39. Andrea Poscia et al., Italy, in ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING OF PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICES IN EUROPE 49, 54 (Bernd Rechel et al. eds., 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK507325/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK507325.pdf (“The National Prevention Plan is
drafted by the Ministry of Health and signed in agreement with the State-Regions Conference.
Each region has to then transpose the national plan in its own regional prevention plan.”).
40. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, NATIONAL PLAN FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO AN
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC (2006), http://www.salute.gov.it/imgs/C_17_pubblicazioni_501_ulte
rioriallegati_ulterioreallegato_0_alleg.pdf.
41. Presidents of the regions are usually called ‘Governors’ of the regions.
42. Mattia Ferraresi, Italy’s Politicians Are Making the Coronavirus Crisis Worse, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Mar. 9, 2020, 3:12 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/09/italy-covid19-coron
avirus-conte-salvini-epidemic-politicians-are-making-crisis-worse/.
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government supported the idea that COVID-19 was not as dangerous as it
had been described and stated that everything was “under control.”43
Authorities not only underestimated the economic impact of the pandemic but
also delayed Rome’s response to COVID-19 until early March.
When the Italian government finally enacted its decrees to manage
COVID-19, it did so with little guidance for the regions. The best example
of this lack of coordination was the DPCM—adopted on March 8—
requiring the lockdown of the entire Lombardy region and some
municipalities.44 Before the Prime Minister issued the decree, one of Italy’s
most prestigious newspapers published its draft text.45 As a result, thousands
of people left Milan to avoid being stuck in the so-called “red zone,” where
the government would begin enforcing the lockdown the next day.46 All who
left the red zone before the government enacted the decree contributed to
spread the virus to the rest of the country—especially to its southern
regions.47 Some regional governors prohibited citizens to return to their
home regions to avoid further contamination. It is plainly evident that better
coordination between national measures and their regional implementation
would have reduced the spread of COVID-19.
By the end of February 2020, the Italian central government enacted
numerous provisions to fight the virus in limited parts of Italy—namely
Lombardy and other small municipalities.48 With the increasing spread of
43. See Jamie Dettmer, Italy’s Moment of Viral Madness, VOA (Feb. 27, 2020, 9:12 AM), https:
//www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/italys-moment-viral-madness
(noting in late February how many Italians did not trust the assurances and were taking their
own measures).
44. Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 8 marzo 2020, n.417, G.U. Mar. 8,
2020, n.59.
45. See Angela Giuffrida & Lorenzo Tondo, Leaked Coronavirus Plan to Quarantine 16m Sparks
Chaos in Italy, GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2020, 11:54 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/20
20/mar/08/leaked-coronavirus-plan-to-quarantine-16m-sparks-chaos-in-italy (explaining how
the quarantine plan was leaked to the newspapers creating a panic).
46. See Elizabeth Schumacher, Italy Fumbles Coronavirus Lockdown Orders, DW (Mar. 8, 2020),
https://www.dw.com/en/italy-fumbles-coronavirus-lockdown-orders/a-52685263 (discussing
how many people fled after learning of the decree); Marzio Toniolo, Inside Italy’s Coronavirus ‘Red
Zone’ – Video Diary, GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2020, 6:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
video/2020/feb/25/inside-italys-coronavirus-red-zone-video-diary (showing the life in the red
zone during lockdowns).
47. See Holly Ellyatt, ‘People Are Very Scared’: Southern Italians Brace Themselves as the Coronavirus
Spreads Across the Country, CNBC (Mar. 31, 2020, 2:18 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/
31/southern-italians-brace-themselves-for-coronavirus-outbreak.html.
48. See Marco Cecili & Andrea Chiappetta, Diritti fondamentali ed emergenza: come la pandemia
covid-19 ha influenzato l’ordinamento giuridico e il bilanciamento dei diritti, in Francesco Saverio Marini
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COVID-19, however, regional governors and city mayors began
implementing their own lockdown measures to address the pandemic. Two
main examples come from regions that the central government had not
declared red zones. On February 22, the President of the Friuli Venezia Giulia
region and a member of the Lega party, Massimiliano Fedriga, requested that
the central government close the region’s territorial borders, but the central
government denied his request.49 Before receiving subsequent authorization
by the central government on March 21, the ‘governor’ adopted additional
limitations and restricted the movements of the region’s residents.50
Similarly, on February 26, Luca Ceriscioli, the President of the Marche
region in central Italy and a member of the center-left party in the majority
coalition, opposed the Italian government’s decision to declare the state of
emergency only in the northern regions. He unilaterally decided to close
schools and suspend all public activities in the entire Marche region. 51 The
region acted without approval from the central government. 52 The
government responded by appealing the decision to the Regional
Administrative Court, which suspended the President’s order.53 The
Presidents of the Basilicata and Calabria regions hinted toward the adoption
of “rebellious” regional ordinances aiming to limit the free movement to
their regions. These ordinances—intended for avoiding contagion from
the “return” of students or workers in northern Italy returning to the
southern regions— would have been in striking violation of Article 120 of
the Italian Constitution. 54
& Gino Scaccia, Emergenza Covid e Ordinamento Costituzionale 23–38 (G. Giappichelli ed., 2020)
(containing the complete list of provisions passed by the Italian government).
49. Coronavirus: Fedriga, Governo esclude controlli confini, ANSA, (Feb. 22, 2020, 6:56 PM),
https://www.ansa.it/friuliveneziagiulia/notizie/2020/02/22/coronavirus-fedrigagovernoesclude-controlli-confini_3ee5d5a5-9b2b-4765-8175-66e7325e5401.html.
50. Friuli Venezia Giulia, Ordinanza contingibile e urgente n. 4/PC (Mar. 21, 2020),
https://www.regione.fvg.it/rafvg/export/sites/default/RAFVG/salute-sociale/COVID19/
allegati/Ordinanza_4_PC_FVG_dd_21_03_2020.pdf.
51. Coronavirus: Marche Asks to be Put on Contagion List, LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO
(Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/english/1208015/coronavir
us-marche-asks-to-be-put-on-contagion-list.html.
52. See id. (discussing Giuseppe Conte’s criticism of Marche’s decree and noting the legal
challenge to it).
53. TAR Reopens Marche Schools, Museums, ANSA (Feb. 27, 2020, 5:24 PM), https://www.an
sa.it/english/news/general_news/2020/02/27/tar-reopens-marche-schools-museums_d5792
28f-8825-4737-baa0-8e11d9d035ed.html.
54. Art. 120 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (“Regions may not levy import or export or transit
duties between Regions or adopt measures that in any way obstruct the freedom of movement
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C. Learning by Monitoring: Turning Conflicts into Cooperation
The conflicts that emerged between the national and regional governments
underscored the need for more coordination. In some cases, the Department
for Civil Protection worked as a negotiator between regions and the central
government, coordinating public health efforts by creating new hospitals and
providing medical equipment.55 Although most regional governors, especially
in the north, did not initially take the situation as seriously as they should have,
they strictly implemented the national measures once the pandemic spread.
On February 21, the Governor of Lombardy created an emergency task
force, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and Civil Protection, to
manage the emergency intensive care unit (ICU).56 Before the outbreak, the
total ICU capacity in Lombardy was approximately 720 beds.57 The
COVID-19 task force was responsible for responding to the demand for
increased ICU capacity and for implementing containment measures.58 The
task force identified the most important public hospitals in the territory and
asked them to implement targeted health measures.59 The regional
governments participating in the task force allocated extra emergency
funding, more health care workers, and additional equipment to ensure that
patients who needed an ICU bed had one.60 One month later, the Italian
government formed a new task force of 300 experts to help Lombardy cope
with the health crisis.61 Following these efforts, the total ICU capacity in
Lombardy rose to about 1,600 beds by late March.62
of persons or goods between Regions. Regions may not limit the right of citizens to work in
any part whatsoever of the national territory.”).
55. See De Nora Supports Italian Civil Protection Agencies in the Fight Against the Coronavirus –
COVID-19 Pandemic, MED. DEVICE NEWS MAG. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://infomeddnews.com/
de-nora-supports-italian-civil-protection-agencies-in-the-fight-against-the-coronavirus-covid19-pandemic/.
56. Giacomo Grasselli et al., Critical Care Utilization for the COVID-19 Outbreak in Lombardy,
Italy: Early Experience and Forecast During an Emergency Response, 323 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1545,
1545–46 (2020).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Giada Zampano, Doctors Respond En Masse to Italy’s Call to Arms, ANADOLU AGENCY
(Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/doctors-respond-en-masse-to-italyscall-to-arms/1774991# (stating that the Italian government has opened bids for 300
additional doctors).
62. See Gallera: in Lombardia superati i 1600 posti in terapia intensive, ASKANEWS (Mar. 29, 2020,
6:19 PM), http://www.askanews.it/cronaca/2020/03/29/gallera-in-lombardia-suprati-i-1600
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Another example of collaboration comes from Veneto, the second mostaffected region after Lombardy. When cases of COVID-19 appeared in
Veneto and the local businesses protested the negative impacts of the
restrictive measures on the local economy, Governor Luca Zaia described
the virus outbreak as a “media pandemic” or “wrong psychosis” and claimed
the press had amplified the seriousness of the situation.63 But when the
contagion spread, Zaia changed his position.64 He immediately established
strict measures to isolate the positive cases in small municipalities, such as in
Vò Euganeo, which offered most citizens coronavirus testing.65 Loyally
cooperating with the central government, Governor Zaia quickly aligned his
policies with directives coming from Rome and requested emergency powers
to adopt more stringent measures than his neighbors.66
A more collaborative approach can be found in the Piedmont region vis-àvis the containment of COVID-19’s spread inside the public retirement home,
Residenze Sanitarie Assistenziali. The Regional government, together with
the Prefectures, the Provincial, and metropolitan city government of Turin,
undersigned a Memorandum of Understanding on March 31, 2020, through
which a set of operational guidelines from the Health Ministry were uniformly
adopted throughout the region.67
Even in the so-called Phase 2—which started May 4, 2020, ended the
integral lockdown, and restarted commercial and industrial businesses—
numerous regional measures were introduced in patent violation of the

-posti-in-terapia-intensiva-pn_20200329_00121/ (discussing the increase from 724 beds to 1,600
added for intensive care).
63. Veneto. Coronavirus. Zaia: “Conseguenze economiche disastrose. Psicosi sbagliata, pandemia
mediatica,” AGENPRESS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.agenpress.it/2020/02/27/veneto-corona
virus-zaia-conseguenze-economiche-disastrose-psicosi-sbagliata-pandemia-mediatica/.
64. See Coronavirus, Zaia avanti per la sua strada: «Non ritiro l'ordinanza: il limite è a 200 metri.
Alimentari chiusi domenica», IL GAZZETTINO (Mar. 21, 2020) [hereinafter Coronavirus, Zaia avanti per
la sua strada], https://www.ilgazzettino.it/nordest/primopiano/coronavirus_zaia_cosa_ha_dett
o_oggi_21_marzo_2020-5124408.html (discussing how the February 20 order will continue and
citizens are required to respect the law).
65. See Sabina Castelfranco, Italy’s Veneto Region to Test Everyone for Coronavirus, VOA (Mar.
24, 2020, 2:51 PM), https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/italys-ve
neto-region-test-everyone-coronavirus (explaining the large-scale testing that was put into action).
66. See Coronavirus, Zaia avanti per la sua strada, supra note 64 (explaining Zaia’s response to
the restrictive order and maintaining its enforcement).
67. See Protocollo d’intesa fra unita’ di crisio- Regione Piemonte, Prefettura di Torino
(anche per le altre preffeture del Piemonte), Cita’ metropolitana e Province del Piemonte (Mar.
31, 2020), https://www.regione.piemonte.it/web/sites/default/files/media/documenti/202004/protocollo_rsa.pdf (containing the relevant guidelines).
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governmental directives.68 Veneto and Lombardy, for example, enacted more
severe restrictions than the ones provided for by the central government.69 On
the contrary, Emilia-Romagna, Liguria, Tuscany, and Calabria regions lifted
the lockdown measures before they were allowed to do so by the central
government.70 Let us take, for example, the ordinance of the President of
Calabria—later challenged by the central government and declared void by
Administrative Regional Tribunal (TAR)— allowed food outlets based in the
region to provide carryout catering, which seemingly anticipated “Phase 2.”71
In essence, Italy’s intergovernmental cooperation was an exercise of
learning by monitoring or, as stated in Charles Sabel’s well-known essay,72 an
attempt to overcome the conflict between learning and monitoring through a
continuous feedback loop among regional, local, and national administration
that happened in both a vertical and horizontal manner. Over the first phase
of prompt reaction to COVID-19, regions were entitled to take part in the
decisionmaking process to draft the measures aimed at tackling the
pandemic.73 However, they had neither a veto power nor a power of proposal.
As a result, the central government was free to unilaterally adopt any measure,
without co-deciding it with the regions. Moreover, the boundaries between
the state emergency powers, the power of all of the 8,000 Italian mayors to
enact contingent and urgent ordinances for health reasons, and the power of
the regional governors to set ordinances safeguarding the public health were
far from clearly defined.
After the regions began to rebel against state regulations, thus
demonstrating that coordination among institutions did not work well, Art.
2 of Law Decree no. 19/202074 vested the regions with the power to propose
68. Phase Two: What Changes in Italy from May 4th?, LOCAL (May 4, 2020, 8:25 AM), https:
//www.thelocal.it/20200504/phase-two-what-changes-in-italy-from-may-4th.
69. Chiara Berardi et al., The COVID-19 Pandemic in Italy: Policy and Technology Impact on
Health and Non-health Outcomes, 9 HEALTH POL’Y TECH. 454, 461 (2020), https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7467905/pdf/main.pdf.
70. Valentina Di Donato, Italian Region of Calabria to Begin Relaxation of Lockdown Measures,
CNN, https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/coronavirus-pandemic-04-30-20-intl/h_364
55217d614dd89e21904c3a8df6098 (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:56 PM).
71. Il Tar Calabria si esprime sull’annulamento dell’ordinanza del President della Regione Calabria del
29 aprile 2020, n. 37., IL DRITTO AMMINISTRAVITO (May 9, 2020), https://www.ildirittoamm
inistrativo.it/Tar-Calabria-si-esprime-annullamento-ordinanza-Presidente-della-RegioneCalabria-29-aprile-2020-n-37/ult1329.
72. Charles Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development, in HANDBOOK
OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY (Columbia L. Sch. Ctr. for L. & Econ. Stud., Working Paper No.
102, 1993), http://www3.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Learning%20by%20Monitoring.pdf.
73. D.L. n. 6/2020 art. 3(1) (It.).
74. Decreto legge 25 marzo 2020, n.19, art II, G.U. Mar. 25, 2020, n.79.
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and modify emergency COVID measures, even when the central
government’s measures were intended to be applied uniformly throughout
the national territory. Furthermore, Art. 3 of the same Law Decree no.
19/202075 authorized the regions to adopt more stringent supplementary
measures than national ones in the event of an increase in the contagion
index in their territory.
The different measures implemented by municipalities in Italy, and the
missteps taken by regional leaders, show how initial conflicts between central
and regional governments can eventually be turned into enhanced
cooperation. 76 However, to avoid Italy’s missteps and learn from its
successes, local governments around the world should seek ways to cooperate
and learn by monitoring for a common purpose to share, both horizontally
and vertically, the most effective measures to respond to the pandemic.77
II.

THE COST OF A WIDESPREAD LOCKDOWN
A. Legal Inflation, Governmental Paternalism, and
the Bureaucratization of Social Norms

The Italian model as a response to the spreading of COVID-19 differed
from the approach that many other EU countries implemented as a
response to this pandemic.78 If almost every country limited fundamental
rights by balancing these restrictions against the protection of public health,
the Italian government used this balancing to justify a widespread
lockdown for sixty-nine days. On top of the long lockdown, the
government applied one-size-fits-all regulations that were not tailored to
the different regions, producing overregulation that constrained the

75. Id. art. III.
76. See Giovanni Di Cosimo & Giacomo Menegus, L’emergenza Coronavirus tra Stato e Regioni:
alla ricerca della leale collaborazione, BIOLAW J. (SPECIAL ISSUE), May 2020, at 183. For a
discussion of similar matters in the U.S. context, see Sheila R. Foster, As COVID-19 Proliferates
Mayors Take Response Lead, Sometimes in Conflicts with Their Governors, GEO. L., https://www.law.
georgetown.edu/salpal/as-covid-19-proliferates-mayors-take-response-lead-sometimes-inconflicts-with-their-governors/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
77. Rebecca Katz et al., A Mayoral Network for Pandemic Preparedness, GLOB. POL’Y J. (June
21, 2018), https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/21/06/2018/mayoral-network-pand
emic-preparedness (providing an example of horizontal and vertical cooperation in pandemic
preparedness of U.S. cities).
78. See generally Arianna Vedaschi, Il Covid-19, l’ultimo stress test per gli ordinamenti democratici:
uno sguardo comparato, 43 DPCE ONLINE 1453, 1461, 1463–65 (2020), http://www.dpceonline
.it/index.php/dpceonline/article/view/1015/988 (providing a comparative view on how
western democracies have reacted to COVID-19).
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intimate life of its citizens, ultimately leading to a bureaucratization of
social life.79
During that time, the regulatory measures adopted by the Italian
government were pervasive and very detailed.80 Rather than releasing a
general preventative framework relying on the citizens’ self-preservation, the
regulations were hyper-detailed and enforced with high penalties. Between
January 30 and April 26, the central government and Parliament passed more
than twenty measures via laws, decrees, and ordinances; the Civil Protection
issued more than twenty ordinances; the Ministry for Health issued more than
one hundred ordinances; and the Ministry for Internal Affairs issued thirteen
decrees.81 As early as the end of April, all issued state rules had filled more than
1,100 pages of the Official Journal, where Italian laws are published.82 Finally,
because Law Decree no. 6/2020 enabled regions and municipalities to specify
and tighten the governmental orders through local regulations, regional
Governors, mayors, and local authorities enacted a wave of new rules.83
Consequently, the overregulation of the lockdown orders resulted in a
patchwork of ambiguous, sometimes contradictory rules, full of references to
national, regional, or European laws and regulations. This complex regulatory
web was impossible for civil servants, politicians, and professionals to grasp, let
alone citizens who were at a loss in this legislative jungle. The bureaucratization
of every aspect of their social life spurred among Italians a Kafkian critique of
an overzealous government that micromanaged, not always very effectively, its
response to the spread of the pandemic.84
79. See Andrea Chiappetta, Less Regulation for Better Regulation: ipertrofia normativa e pressappochismo
linguistico ai tempi della pandemia da Covid-19, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI, June 15, 2020,
at 717, 722–25, http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/
45-Chiappetta-FQC-2-20.pdf (noting specific examples of how vaguely worded DPCMs meant
to clarify restrictions actually create further confusion and limit freedoms of citizens); Nicoletta
Rangone, Italy’s Complex Legislative Framework Impairs Its COVID-19 Response, REGUL. REV. (June 8,
2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/06/08/rangone-italy-complex-legislative-framew
ork-impairs-covid-19-response/ (discussing the complex and shifting administrative requirements
placed on citizens leaving home for authorized activities).
80. See Italian Government Actions, INT’L CTR. THEORETICAL PHYSICS, https://www.ictp.it/
ictp_covidresponse/italian-government-actions.aspx#close (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
81. See Cecili & Chiappetta, supra note 48, at 23–30.
82. Giuliano Armeno, Covid, in 54 giorni oltre mille pagine di norme: Scaccia e la giungla delle leggi,
ALESSIO PORCU (May 6, 2020), https://www.alessioporcu.it/articoli/gino-scaccia-giunglamille-leggi-emergenza-covid/.
83. D.L. n. 6/2020 (It.).
84. See, e.g., Francesco Orofino, Kafka, il coronavirus e l’architettura nel Paese del “combinato
disposto,” ONE LISTONE GIORDANO, https://one.listonegiordano.com/architettura/kafka-il-
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One example is the self-certification that every resident had to carry with
them when leaving their homes to go to work, to shop, or to the pharmacy.
The self-certification’s online format changed multiple times, which caused
a panic among citizens to ensure they printed the correct form. In the streets,
police checked for self-certifications, and the inability to produce proper
documentation resulted in the police levying fines or sending citizens back
home.85 Another example is the interpretative dilemma created by the
notion of “congiunti,” or “family members,” in the DPCM of April 26, 2020,
which considered the movement to meet another family member” necessary
and therefore legal.86 However, the definition of congiunti does not appear in
the Italian Civil Code. Therefore, the question was whether it included
cohabitants or same-sex partners—especially when these relations do not fall
under the legal categorization that only includes married couples.
As Antonio Baldassarre, the emeritus President of the Constitutional Court,
pointed out, such interpretation would have privileged only family members
because it left out those not included in the traditional nuclear family,87
including same-sex partners or cohabitants. The central government
immediately clarified that congiunti included “affetti stabili,”88 or “stable
relationships”—a definition that, rather than clarifying, created even more
confusion. For instance, would a long-term mistress be included within this
definition, or a long-term friendship between widows? Due to the vagueness
and difficulty to qualify these family ties, it is not surprising that public
authorities have generally preferred not to levy fines based on that part of the
said DPCM.
coronavirus-e-larchitettura-nel-paese-del-combinato-disposto/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2021);
Eliana Agata Marchese, Autocertificazione firmata da Kafka, L’ADIGE.IT (May 7, 2020, 1:14 PM),
https://www.ladige.it/blogs/diario-mamma-prof/2020/05/07/autocertificazione-firmatakafka; I Meme più divertenti sui Dpcm di Conte e sulle autocertificazioni, IL FARO (Mar. 25, 2020, 12:00
PM), https://www.ilfaroonline.it/2020/03/25/i-meme-piu-divertenti-sui-dpcm-di-conte-esulle-autocertificazioni/328221/.
85. Alessandro Di Paola & Gabriel Frasca, Riflessioni critiche in tema di Covid 19 e
autocertificazione, AVVOCATOANDREANI (Apr. 8, 2020), https://news.avvocatoandreani.it/arti
coli/riflessioni-critiche-tema-covid-autocertificazione-105690.html.
86. Alfonso Celotto, Chi sono i nostri congiunti in diritto? Lo spiega Celotto, FORMICHE (Apr. 27,
2020), https://formiche.net/2020/04/fas-2-congiunti-diritto/.
87. Roberta Lanzara, Baldassarre: “Dpcm in tutto incostituzionale,” ADNKRONOS (Apr. 27,
2020, 5:46 PM), https://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/politica/2020/04/27/baldassarre-dpcmtutto-incostituzionale_NCkg79J8eVOblBGG6m3byH.html.
88. See Coronavirus: Italia verso la Fase 2, ok alle visite ai congiunti, compresi fidanzati e ‘affetti stabili,’
ANSA.IT (May 1, 2020, 7:02 PM), https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2020/04/27/
coronavirus-litalia-verso-la-fase-2-fra-cautele-e-polemiche_1faa2a81-9e44-4e67-b733-0e0e0d
c1177e.html.

3. NICOLA & SCACCIA (ITALY)_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

70

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

3/5/2021 6:25 AM

[73:1

B. The Italian Parliament as Sleeping Beauty
To face the COVID-19 pandemic, the Italian government relied on two
main forms of regulations: law decrees and Presidential Decrees adopted by
the Prime Minister. While law decrees are specifically designed in the Italian
Constitution to deal with emergencies, Presidential Decrees adopted by the
Prime Minister do not have the same legal force as laws. During this
emergency situation, the government has used DPCMs broadly to fight the
spread of the virus, limiting fundamental rights enshrined in the Italian
Constitution protecting personal liberty,89 freedom of movement,90 freedom
of assembly,91 freedom to profess religious belief,92 right to education,93 and
right to economic enterprise initiative.94 While these constitutional rights are
not absolute, the possibility to limit them stems from Parliament’s exclusive
adoption of laws. Therefore, DPCMs are administrative provisions and are
not the correct legislative instrument envisaged by the Constitution to
restrain fundamental rights.
The numerous DPCMs adopted by the government to contain the spread
of the pandemic cannot be legally grounded on Article 78 of the Italian
Constitution, even broadly interpreted. This provision allows the central
government to enact decrees having the force of law only in case of war.95 Such
a speculation could hardly be supported here because public health
emergencies, although in some scholars’ view are “like a war,” 96 are different
from wars declared between nation states and approved by parliaments.
Additionally, Article 78 allows the entire government, not the Prime Minister
alone, to enact such decrees. Finally, the government can act under Article 78
only if explicitly authorized by the Parliament. Currently, the Italian
government’s justification for using DPCMs rather than law decrees is
grounded in the need to speed up the adoption of emergency measures.
However, marginalizing the role of the Parliament is dangerous to democracy.
While many measures were introduced through DPCMs, the most
powerful set of norms was enacted with the Cure Italy Decree. This
89. Art. 13 COSTITUZIONE [COST.].
90. Art. 16 COSTITUZIONE [COST.].
91. Art. 17 COSTITUZIONE [COST.].
92. Art. 19 COSTITUZIONE [COST.].
93. Art. 33 COSTITUZIONE [COST.].
94. Art. 41 COSTITUZIONE [COST.].
95. “Parliament has the authority to declare a state of war and vest the necessary powers
into the Government.” Art. 78 COSTITUZIONE [COST.].
96. Angela Giuffrida, ‘This Is Like a War’: View from Italy’s Coronavirus Frontline, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 17, 2020, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/17/this-is-likea-war-view-from-italys-coronavirus-frontline.
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provision included a massive package of financial measures by the Italian
government in support of families, workers, and enterprises.97 An extensive
political debate should have ensued in Parliament over the scope and value
of these financial measures. For this reason, it was extremely important for
the Italian Parliament to meet and have the main legislative body initiate
proceedings for the transposition of the provisional law decrees into law.
However, just like Sleeping Beauty, the Parliament was slow to get in motion
and was awakened by the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, who
recalled the relevance of democratic deliberations and that the government
should work on a multipartisan platform before Parliament to transparently
debate how to reasonably balance respect for fundamental freedoms and the
need to protect public health.98
Despite the presidential wishes, the government continued to adopt the
most powerful set of policies with no meaningful consultation of
parliamentary minorities. On the contrary, the government limited the
parliamentary debate through a special approval procedure called “vote of
confidence,” which is frequently used by the Executive to make all the
proposed parliamentary amendments fall with a single vote and thus restricts
the parliamentary bargaining. The most important governmental acts,
namely the already mentioned Cure Italy Decree and Liquidity Decree,
followed this procedure. The Parliament did not meet as a full body since
the number of members that could attend each session was limited.
Therefore, a robust discussion of the legislation did not happen in person nor
electronically. In fact, Article 64 of the Constitution and dozens of internal
regulations of the Parliament remain vague as to the possibility of an “online”
deliberation.99 Although initially absent and through a slow adaptation, the
Parliament finally amended some of the governmental decrees and managed
to speed up the democratic legislative process.
C. A Targeted and Decentralized Regulatory Approach
The regional “rebel” measures highlighted above show two flaws in the
government’s emergency policies: the weak institutional cooperation and the
97. See Tega & Massa, supra note 34.
98. Barbara Tedalddi, Mattarella chiama governo e opposizione e chiede unita, AGENZIA ITALIA
(March 19, 2020), https://www.agi.it/politica/news/2020-03-19/coronavirus-mattarellaconte-salvini-meloni-berlusconi-7685147/.
99. See Gino Scaccia & Andrea Carboni, Funzionalità del Parlamento e modalità di voto
nell’emergenza, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI, Aug. 4, 2020, at 122–25, http://www.
forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/12-Scaccia-Carboni-FQC3-20.pdf (discussing the different interpretions on meaning and scope of Article 64’s definition
of “presence” and its effect on parliamentary procedure during COVID-19).
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lack of targeted, differentiated, and decentralized regulations. The principle
of regulatory differentiation is expressed in Article 118 of the Constitution,
along with the subsidiarity principle of enabling by default local authorities to
exercise administrative powers unless they are unable to do so and a national
measure is needed. Because the virus spread in the Italian territory with
elevated contagions in the north, very limited contagions in the center, and
almost nonexistent contagions in large parts of southern Italy, the one-size-fitsall regulatory approach of the government inevitably clashed with the principle
of differentiation. It also clashed with the principle of proportionality because
the government applied regulations in a uniform manner, even when the
contagion was decreasing.100 The lockdown measures not only targeted the
northern regions but also territories where the pandemic was almost absent.
This limited the fundamental rights of the residents in those non-infected
regions and possibly violated the principle of proportionality, as it is recognized
in Italian and EU constitutional law.101
In a second regulatory phase, however, the Italian government turned to
a more tailored and decentralized approach, giving more regulatory space to
the regions. For instance, in approaching the economic reopening, the
government delegated to the regional presidents the responsibility to
differentiate the anti-COVID-19 measures on the territory. In particular,
Article 1, paragraph 14 of Law Decree no. 33/2020 tasked the regions to
adopt a regulatory framework to prevent or reduce the risks of contagion for

100. See Gino Scaccia & Christian D’Orazi, La concorrenza fra Stato e autonomie territoriali nella
gestione della crisi sanitaria fra unitarietà e differenziazione, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI, Aug
4. 2020, at 117, http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/
11-Scaccia-DOrazi-FQC-3-20.pdf.
101. Proportionality is a key concept in global constitutionalism. For a deep analysis of the
principle, see PETER LERCHE, ÜBERMASS UND VERFASSUNGSRECHT: ZUR BINDUNG DES
GESETZGEBERS AN DIE GRUNDSÄTZE DER VERHÄLTNISMÄßIGKEIT UN DER ERFORDERLICHKEIT
(1961); see also AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS (Doron Kalir trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012) (2010). The Italian
Constitutional Court has stated that “reasonableness and proportionality . . . are general
constraints of the legislative action intended to limit individual rights.” Corte Cost. [Constitutional
Court], 9 gennaio 1997, n.1, G.U. (spec. ser.), Jan. 15, 1997, n.3 (It.) (translation by the Authors).
The proportionality test is widespread in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European
Union, the European Court of Human Rights, and of many constitutional courts all over the
world. See generally Gino Scaccia, Proportionality and the Balancing of Rights in the Case-law of EU Courts,
FEDERALISMI.IT (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.federalismi.it/ApplOpenFilePDF.cfm?artid=380
92&dpath=document&dfile=18022019195153.pdf&content=Proportionality%2Band%2Bthe
%2BBalancing%2Bof%2BRights%2Bin%2Bthe%2BCase%2Dlaw%2Bof%2BEU%2BCourts
%2B%2B%2D%2Bstato%2B%2D%2Bdottrina%2B%2D%2B.
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the return to economic and social activities.102 This decentralized approach
undertaken by the Italian government did not happen without conflicts with
the regions or ambiguities in its implementation; although, at the declaratory
level, the government embraced the regional framework in its DPCM of May
17, 2020.103 Some regions, however, almost in protest against the government
because of the lack of guidelines for security measures, postponed the
reopening of their economic activities.
Decentralization and differentiation in the economic reopening of Italy
should not undermine the effectiveness of such regulatory measures.
However, this is what happened with the smart monitoring and tracing
systems of the contagion that the government attempted to establish through
downloadable applications on the citizens’ smartphones. The government
set up an app called “Immuni,” or “Immune,” that was sent to all residents
to download on their cell phones. Even though there are sixty million
people in Italy owning about eighty million smartphones—demonstrating
how many Italians own multiple devices—the app was downloaded by only
nine million inhabitants.104 Since the Immuni App did not achieve the
critical mass of downloads to realize the tracing goal for which it was
created, this was a huge setback for the Italian government. Part of this
debacle was driven by the Italians’ lack of trust in the government and, in
particular, lack of trust in a tracing system perceived as too invasive of their
privacy.105 In addition, the competition with similar apps created by the
regions led to a duplication and confusion in the implementation of
monitoring regimes.106 This lack of coordination triggered even more
misperception in the general public and undermined the regulatory strategy
of contact tracing of COVID-19.

102. Decreto legge 16 maggio 2020, n.33, G.U. May 16, 2020, n.125.
103. Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 17 maggio 2020, n.1058, G.U. May
17, 2020, n.126.
104. Roberta Zanon, Report Digital 2020: lo scenario nel mondo e in Italia, DIGIT.
DICTIONARY: BLOG (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.digitaldictionary.it/blog/report-digital2020-scenario-digitale-mondo-e-italia (reporting 2020 Internet and social media trends and
statistics in Italy); Immuni: Here’s What You Need to Know About Using Italy’s Contact-tracing App,
LOCAL (Oct. 6, 2020, 9:13 AM), https://www.thelocal.it/20201006/immuni-heres-whatyou-need-to-know-about-using-italys-contact-tracing-app.
105. See Martina Cardone & Marco Cecili, Osservazioni sulla disciplina in materia di tutela dei
dati personali in tempi di Covid-19. L’Italia e i modelli sudcoreano, israeliano e cinese: opzioni a confronto,
NOMOS-LE ATTUALITÀ DEL DIRITTO (2020), http://www.nomos-leattualitaneldiritto.it/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/Cardone-Cecili-1-2020-REV-1.pdf.
106. See Michele Paolo, Why Italy’s Contact Tracing Is Not Working, ITALICS MAG. (Nov. 11,
2020), https://italicsmag.com/2020/11/11/why-italys-contact-tracing-is-not-working/.
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CONCLUSION: BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH COOPERATION AND
GOVERNMENTAL DISTRUST
In March 2020, the European Central Bank issued a new asset purchase
plan worth €750 billion, the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme
(PEPP), lasting until the end of 2020 to support the liquidity and the financial
condition of all sectors of the Eurozone economy.107 This measure has
greatly benefited the Italian government, whose economy was halted due to
a granularly implemented lockdown throughout the Italian territory that
came at a high cost. The stress test for Italian institutions included an
empowered executive branch, that only after a late fine-tuning through
learning by monitoring adjustment, overcame conflicts with the regions to
become an effective model of regional-national cooperation for public health
policies. In a second phase, both the regions and the Parliament had to learn
how to adapt to the new mode of governance established by the government.
During this phase, the role of President Sergio Mattarella was central in
reestablishing the institutional balance in governing the country by insisting
on the need for greater involvement of the legislative branch and the regions
in executive decisionmaking.
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the weaknesses of the Italian
constitutional and administrative system, especially on how to manage a
national emergency in exceptional circumstances. In order to be effective
and timely, during the first phase of the pandemic, the government
centralized its decisionmaking while marginalizing both regions and the
Parliament. The dialectic between the different levels of governments
through regionalism, as well as between the executive and the legislative
branches, are an integral part of the pluralist constitutional Italian style.108
However, after some initial central-regional conflicts, the Italian system
reached a new equilibrium that has allowed the institutions to cooperate
democratically. This learning by monitoring process in national–regional
cooperation entailed the sharing of information and the monitoring of public
health policies that succeeded in containing the spread of the pandemic and
eventually enabled the reopening of the Italian economy.

107. The Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) was announced by the
European Central Bank (ECB) in the press release on March 18, 2020. ECB Announces €750
Billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), EUR. CTR. BANK (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.htm
l. See generally Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), EUR. CTR. BANK, https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
108. See Vittoria BARSOTTI ET AL., ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN GLOBAL
CONTEXT 231 (2016).
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The lesson learned during the COVID-19 pandemic was that during a
public health emergency, it was necessary to shorten the chain of command
and practice stricter coordination between national and regional public
health administrations. Part of the reason why this tighter practice did not
happen earlier was the lack of constitutional and administrative frameworks
defining the roles and responsibilities of each actor involved in the crisis.
Finally, the government’s response to the pandemic also exposed traditional
weaknesses of the Italian system, which include: overregulation; overlapping
of state, regional, and municipal regulatory competencies on the same
territory; and finally, excessive bureaucratization that paralyzed economic and
social life throughout the country. In fact, during the spread of the pandemic,
Italians were micromanaged by an overzealous government that transformed
them into vulnerable citizens who had to expose even their most intimate
relations to public authorities in order to leave their homes. In hindsight,
rather than adopting a wave of regulations in a frantic and paternalistic effort
to protect its citizens, restricting individual liberties, and educating citizens on
how to behave, the government could have empowered citizens by asking
them to take more responsibilities and duties and forgone imposing high fines
and criminal sanctions for those who did not comply with the lockdown
measures. While this governmental approach has eroded some of the public
trust that citizens had in the current administration, making it difficult to
implement similar measures in the future, the model of regional cooperation
in public health and the renewed effort to establish democratic parliamentary
cooperation with the executive branch will stay in place.

